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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
both parties desire the divorce; neither party would be likely to
urge a law less favorable to the granting of the divorce than the
law of the forum.
Roy M. Lilly, Jr.
FAMILY LAW-CAN THE CIVIL OBLIGATION To SUPPORT AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD BE ESTABLISHED IN A PROCEEDING
FOR CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF A CHILD?
The accused was convicted under Criminal Code Article 74,
as amended by Act 368 of 1952,' of criminal neglect of a child
found, on the basis of evidence introduced at the trial, to be
his illegitimate offspring. The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and held, according to the interpretation of the writer,
that under Article 74 of the Criminal Code, as amended, it is
criminal for a parent to refuse to provide support for an illegit-
imate child only if it has been established in a civil proceeding
that he is the parent of the child. State v. Mack, 71 So.2d 315 (La.
1954).
Article 74 of the Louisiana Criminal Code originally pro-
vided: "Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional
non-support: ... (2) By either parent of his minor child who is
in destitute or necessitous circumstances. . . ." Apparently there
was some doubt as to illegitimate children being included within
this article, for by Act 164 of 1950 the phrase "whether legitimate
or illegitimate" was inserted after the word "child." In three
decisions 2 in 1951 and 1952, the Supreme Court held (1) that it
was impossible to convict a person of criminal neglect of family
unless at the time of the alleged neglect he was under a civil obli-
gation to support the person whom he is charged with neglecting;
(2) that Article 74 of the Criminal Code as amended in 1950
did not establish a civil obligation; and (3) that the obligation
to support an illegitimate child arises only upon the establish-
ment of illegitimate filiation under the articles of the Civil Code,
that is, by a voluntary formal acknowledgment by the parent or
1. LA: R.S. § 14:74 (Supp. 1952).
2. State v. Love, 220 La. 562, 57 So.2d 187 (1952); State v. Sims, 220 La.
532, 57 So.2d 177 (1952); State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724 (1951).
Strong dissents were filed in these cases.
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by a civil judgment declaratory of parentage rendered pursuant
to the provisions of the Civil Code itself.3
By Act 368 of 1952, Article 74 was amended to read as
follows:
"Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional
non-support:
"(2) By either parent of his minor child, whether legit-
imate or illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous
circumstances, there being a duty established by this article
for either parent to support his child. The parent shall
have this duty without regard to his reasons and irrespective
of the causes of his living separate from the other parent. The
duty established by this article shall apply retrospectively
to all children, legitimate or illegitimate, born prior to the
effective date of this article.
"In the case of an illegitimate child, evidence may be
introduced in the proceedings hereunder to prove paternity
or maternity. This proof shall be made in accordance with
the rules established by the Revised Civil Code of 1870, as
amended, as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil
purposes. Such proof, however, shall be used solely as the
basis for the duty to support an illegitimate child established
by this article, and shall not be construed as establishing any
civil obligation." (Italicized portion added by the 1952
amendment.)
It seems obvious that the legislature intended to negative
the effect of the 1951 and 1952 decisions of the Supreme Court.
Yet the decision in the instant case regards the 1952 amendment
as a mere rephrasing of the 1950 amendment which does not
change its content or effect. In the words of the court, "No appre-
ciable change has been made in the statutory requirements. They
are the same now as they were before the amendment was
enacted. ' '4 Three vigorous dissenting opinions5 maintain that the
majority evaded the provisions of the act and defeated the plain
intent of the legislature.
3. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-
Criminal Neglect of Family, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 261 (1953).
4. State v. Mack, 71 So.2d 315, 317 (La. 1954).
5. See dissenting opinions of Justices Hamiter, Hawthorne and McCaleb
in State v. Mack, 71 So.2d 315, 317, 318, 319 (La. 1954).
1954]
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Article 13 of the Civil Code of 1870 states, "When a law is
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Article 18
declares that, "The universal and most effectual way of discover-
ing the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious,
is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which
induced the Legislature to enact it." Article 3 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code states that, "The articles of this Code cannot be
extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for
herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the
objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine
construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken
in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with
reference to the purpose of the provision." It would seem that
the court violated these rules of statutory construction. It hardly
can be denied that the legislature intended to place the duty of
support on the parents of illegitimate children in necessitous
circumstances regardless of the previous establishment of filia-
tion. If this had not been the purpose of the legislature, then there
would not have been any reason for the 1952 amendment.
It is therefore submitted that the Supreme Court mi.ght have
based its decision on other reasons than those it assigned for its
judgment. There is an indication of this in the majority opinion.
Justice Moise states: "It is a duty of this Court to be watchful
of the legal and constitutional rights of its citizens and guard
them against any stealthy encroachment. Our motto should be
'Obsta Principiis'- resist the first beginning. Do not let the
tyranny of an erroneous legal concept get a start."6 The majority
of the court may have felt that the legislation offended their sense
of justice, or was contrary to natural law or the best public
order. If so, it would have been better for the court to have
based their decision on more conventional grounds and to have
followed more closely the canons of interpretation. No doubt our
law does not admit formally of the possibility of an act of the
legislature being invalid by reason of its conflict with the natural
law.7 The court, however, could have considered the legislation
to be in violation of substantive due process of law. In the case
of Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage
6. State v. Mack, 71 So.2d 315, 317 (La. 1954).
7. Art. 1, LA. CIvIL CODH of 1870.
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Control,8 the court, quoting from American Jurisprudence,9 said:
"'The legislature has no power, under the guise of police regula-
tions, arbitrarily to invade the personal rights and liberty of the
individual citizen, to interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations,
or to invade property rights'." If the court felt that fundamental
rights were being invaded under Article 74 as amended, as it
seems they did feel, they should have invalidated the law on
those grounds.
William J. Doran
LOUISIANA PRAcTIcE-RES JUDICATA-MASTER AND SERVANT
Plaintiff sued the state, after its waiver of immunity, to re-
cover damages for the death of her husband. Her claim was
based solely upon the alleged negligence of the state's employees.
In a suit previously instituted against the employees on the same
cause of action, the employees had been declared free of fault and
judgment had been rendered accordingly. In the present pro-
ceedings, the state interposed the exception of res judicata, based
upon the judgment in favor of the employees rendered in the
prior suit. Held, exception sustained. The Supreme Court has
made an exception to the Civil Code requirement of identity of
parties for invoking res judicata, and this case falls within the ex-
ception. McKnight v. State, 68 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1953).
The Supreme Court decision relied on by the court of appeal
is Muntz v. Algiers.' In that case, plaintiff had sued defendant
railway company's lessee for the death of his child, and the lessee
had been found innocent of fault. In a contemporaneous action
in a different court against defendant railway company as the
vicariously liable lessor, plaintiff relied entirely on the alleged
negligence of defendant's lessee. Defendant's exception of res
judicata, founded on the judgment exonerating the lessee ren-
dered while the suit against the defendant lessor was pending,
was sustained. Article 2286 of the Civil Code, from which the
Louisiana principles of res judicata emanate, was not mentioned
in the court's opinion.
8. 216 La. 148, 172, 43 So.2d 248, 256 (1949).
9. 11 AM. JUR. 1078, § 303 (1937).
1. Muntz v. Algiers & G. St. Ry., 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906).
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